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The authors first published a commentary on tax compliance, self-assessment and administration in New Zealand in James, S. and 
Alley, C. (1999) „Tax compliance, self-assessment and administration in New Zealand - Is the carrot or the stick more appropriate to 
encourage compliance?‟ New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, April, pp. 3-14. The proposals in the article 
remain relevant. However, further developments in the economic and behavioural approaches to tax compliance and the taxpayer-
based studies recently undertaken have added a new dimension to the analysis. The authors have therefore revisited and updated the 
original proposals. 
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Abstract 
Tax compliance is likely to become even more important with developments such as self-
assessment and electronic commerce. This paper re-examines the meaning of tax 
compliance. It finds that existing definitions are usually too narrow to encompass the topic in 
full and a wider definition is offered. The paper describes the purpose of tax compliance and 
the factors that affect the willingness of taxpayers to comply with a tax system. It discusses 
two different approaches to tax compliance and suggests that caution should be shown in 
the use of penalties and the emphasis should be on assisting citizens to meet their tax 
obligations. Fortunately recent developments have seen closer cooperation between tax 
agencies and academic researchers. A pressing task is the development of an approach that 
incorporates both the economic and behavioural approaches to tax compliance and a 
successful strategy for tax compliance must give due weight to all relevant factors and their 
interaction. 
Introduction 
It has never been easy to persuade all taxpayers to comply with the requirements of a tax 
system. Tax compliance is likely to become a more significant aspect of tax policy as most of 
the old problems remain and new considerations are raised by developments such as self-
assessment, the emergence of the global economy and electronic commerce. These factors 
have policy implications about the way the tax system should be administered. In particular, 
one risk with self-assessment is the temptation to rely on a harsher enforcement regime. It 
has been alleged from time to time, for example, that the Internal Revenue Service in the 
USA has sometimes relied on over-zealous enforcement or unduly punitive methods of 
securing compliance with their self-assessed income tax system (Payne, 1993). However, 
there seems to have been signs of fundamental change in the approach of some tax 
agencies with respect to taxpayers. For example, in the United States, the Internal Revenue 
Service, long known for its very firm approach to taxpayers, has been considering a rather 
different stance. In its document Reinventing Service at the IRS (Internal Revenue Service, 
1997) Vice President Al Gore and Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin stated that „We must 
have an IRS that is on the taxpayers‟ side, providing the help they need‟ but „We know we 
have a long way to go‟. That report addressed the question „What if the Internal Revenue 
Service thought of taxpayers as customers?‟ 
 
As the primary purpose of taxation is to benefit rather than punish citizens, this would seem 
to be an appropriate policy. Furthermore, as Montesquieu (1748) put it succinctly, „the 
unreasonable severity of the laws obstructs their execution‟. No doubt sanctions will always 
have to exist to support tax administration, but there are important questions as to the extent 
they are needed and the enthusiasm with which they should be enforced. There are also 
more positive ways of promoting tax compliance that are more consistent with the role of 
public spending as a net public benefit. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine issues of tax compliance in the light of a 
changing environment for tax administration in New Zealand and, across the world. The first 
section examines the importance of compliance and some of the effects of non-compliance. 
In the second section it is suggested that existing definitions of tax compliance are 
incomplete. In particular it will be argued that non-compliance involves more than tax 
evasion - the attempt to reduce tax liability by illegal means. Non-compliance also includes 
some forms of tax avoidance - reducing taxation by legal means. The third section revisits 
the purpose of taxation - it is a means not an end, and compliance is part of that means - 
and questions the point of incorporating fear and punishment into a system designed to 
promote the public good. The fourth section analyses explanations of compliance and the 
fifth section is a brief diversion into tax policy compliance in New Zealand. The conclusion in 
the final section is that there are alternative methods of promoting compliance and that it is 
important to strike the right balance in encouraging voluntary compliance as well as deterring 
wilful non-compliance. 
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Factors affecting Tax Compliance 
There is no doubt that compliance is a major problem confronting all revenue authorities. For 
instance, in the USA the Internal Revenue Service has gone to considerable trouble to 
estimate the amounts of tax revenue, which are not collected under the American system of 
self-assessment. One measure is the „net tax gap.‟ This is the difference between „true‟ 
individual income tax liability and that finally collected on a voluntary basis or by enforcement 
action (the concept of the „tax gap‟ is discussed in the next section). It has been estimated to 
be between $US 78.3 to 80.4 billion or 14.2 to 15 per cent of US personal income tax liability 
in 1992 (Internal Revenue Service, 1996). The majority of this loss consisted of the under-
reporting of income, with smaller proportions attributable to the non-filing of returns and 
overstating tax deductions. 
 
Self-assessment has implications for compliance and a movement towards a greater 
element of self-assessment has been taking place in countries such as New Zealand (Inland 
Revenue Department, 1995), the UK (James, 1995) and Australia (Sandford & Wallschutzky, 
1994). Under self-assessment it is the responsibility of the taxpayer rather than the revenue 
authority to calculate the relevant tax liability and to ensure that the requirements regarding 
payment and so on are met (Barr, James & Prest, 1977). 
 
The Concept of Tax Compliance 
The definition of tax compliance in its most simple form is usually cast in terms of the degree 
to which taxpayers comply with the tax law. However like many such concepts, the meaning 
of compliance can be seen almost as a continuum of definitions. This ranges from the 
narrow law enforcement approach, through wider economic definitions and on to even more 
comprehensive versions relating to taxpayer decisions to conform to the wider objectives of 
society as reflected in tax policy. 
 
Taking the narrow end of the continuum first, one suggestion is that the degree of non-
compliance may be measured in terms of the „tax gap‟. This represents the difference 
between the actual revenue collected and the amount that would be collected if there were 
100 per cent compliance. For instance the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department refers 
to „minimising the tax gap between theoretical revenue and actual revenue‟ (1997, para. 1.2) 
[italics in the original] but without specifying what „theoretical revenue‟ means. There are 
some variations. For instance, and rather curiously, Brand (1996, p.413) refers to the „market 
share‟ of the Internal Revenue Service in the USA. Markets, of course, usually refer to the 
commercial transactions between free agents without the need for coercion or problems of 
compliance. However, what Brand means by market share is „the amount of the projected 
total tax base that the IRS actually collects.‟(1996, p.414). Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 
(1998) include a time dimension to compliance but are still mainly concerned with tax 
evasion as the central part of the tax gap definition.    As they put it:    „A popular indication of 
the  magnitude of evasion is the tax gap  -  the  difference  between the federal income taxes 
households actually owe, and what they report and pay voluntarily on a timely basis.‟(p.818). 
The IRS has two definitions - gross tax gap and the net tax gap mentioned above. The gross 
tax gap (1996, p.5) is the amount of „true‟ tax liability that is paid „voluntarily‟ and on time and 
the net tax gap is this amount less tax paid late or collected by the IRS through enforcement 
activities. Both the gross and net tax gaps can be subdivided into the three main 
components (Internal Revenue Service, 1996, p.8) - the non-filing gap, the under-reporting 
gap, and the underpayment gap. The underreporting gap is in turn made up of three 
elements - underreported income, overstated offsets and net arithmetical mistakes. 
 
A major concern with such definitions is that they might be taken to indicate a certainty in the 
measurement of tax compliance that does not exist. Tax law is not always precise. Indeed, 
although legal definitions are often of the tax gap form, there are sometimes practical 
difficulties of interpretation. Bergman (1998) suggests that tax compliance „is what the state 
assumes is legally owed by taxpayers, but the state and taxpayers do not necessarily share 
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the same interpretation‟. The extent to which taxpayers dispute the meaning of the tax law 
can depend on a number of things, including their basic willingness to comply with a tax 
system. The basic concept of the „tax gap‟ of non-compliance seems to be inadequate. The 
„tax gap‟ definition and measure are far too simplistic for practical policy purposes since 
successful tax administration requires taxpayers to cooperate in the operation of a tax 
system rather than to be forced to carry out every aspect of their tax obligations. Tax law 
cannot cope with every eventuality (see for example James and Wallschutzky, 1995) and 
therefore has to be supplemented with supporting provisions. Administrative procedures and 
decisions as well as appeal arrangements all have a part to play but the tax system cannot 
work properly without a reasonable degree of willing compliance on the part of taxpayers 
themselves. 
 
There is the question whether „compliance‟ refers to voluntary or compulsory behaviour. If 
taxpayers „comply‟ only because of dire threats or harassment or both, this would not appear 
to be proper compliance even if 100 per cent of the tax were raised in line with the „tax gap‟ 
concept of noncompliance. Instead, it might be argued that successful tax administration 
requires taxpayers to comply willingly, without the need for enquiries, obtrusive 
investigations, reminders or the threat or application of legal or administrative sanctions. A 
more appropriate definition could therefore include the degree of compliance with tax law 
and administration, which can be achieved without the actual application of enforcement 
activity. 
 
This „voluntary‟ aspect appears in the definition supplied by Andreoni et al. (1998) above and 
is important. This recognises a basic difference in terms of compliance between tax paid 
without direct enforcement activity and tax paid as a result of it. 
 
There is also a difficulty with the idea that there is some fixed tax revenue that would be 
collected if all taxpayers simply observed 100 per cent obedience to the law. The level of 
potential tax revenue is determined by the level of economic activity. It is possible that an 
intrusive tax regime might reduce the willingness of taxpayers to earn more money or 
engage in commercial activity not only because of the associated tax liability but because 
that extra liability might involve inconvenient administrative requirements or the risk of a 
heavy handed official response. This is rather like the „spite effect‟ described by Musgrave 
(1959, p.240). For instance, it might be the case that workers behave differently to changes 
in wage rates caused by taxes than they do to changes caused by market forces. If taxes 
were considered to be intrusive or unfair, taxpayers might wish to reduce their tax liability by 
working less. Even though this will have a cost to themselves that might be outweighed by a 
feeling of revenge. It is also possible that taxes might be used as an excuse to avoid 
unwanted overtime or other obligations. It is not known how powerful any spite effects might 
be but it is clearly possible that, apart from the direct costs of compliance themselves, 
difficulties in the willingness of taxpayers to comply might affect the revenue potential itself. 
The „tax gap‟ definition of non-compliance might then have been partly satisfied because 
there is less to collect.  
 
A fuller economic definition of compliance should also take into account other possible 
economic effects of the tax system and its enforcement. There has been some economic 
analysis of such possibilities, for example, by Cowell (1985) who considered the case where 
a worker can choose not just between working in the legal or illegal sectors but how much 
time to spend in work of any sort as opposed to leisure. It has also been specifically shown 
that uncertainty in tax audits could affect labour supply (Horowitz & Horowitz, 2000). 
It seems reasonable to conclude that tax administration could reduce potential tax revenue 
by discouraging taxable economic activity. Paradoxically, therefore, a severe tax 
enforcement policy could even claim to have improved tax compliance by the narrow „tax 
gap‟ definition because it would have reduced the amount there was to collect. 
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Timing issues will also affect the value of the potential revenue available. A taxpayer might 
eventually pay his or her full liability but if it is paid late it cannot be considered to be full 
compliance, or worth as much as tax liability paid on time or even before the due date. In 
economic terms, money in the future is worth less than the same nominal sum of money 
now. If the Government does not receive tax payments on time it either increases the 
amount it has to raise elsewhere or reduces the revenue available for public expenditure. 
Although late payments of tax fit many of the „tax gap‟ measures, they do not represent full 
compliance. 
 
An interesting aspect of the timing issue is where interest is charged on late paid tax. 
Interest charged at an economic rate would neutralise the problem from the point of view of 
the revenue, though it may still not fit definitions of compliance. However, in some 
jurisdictions interest is charged at a higher rate and, particularly when combined with 
penalties can result in a very high effective rate indeed. The implications with respect to New 
Zealand will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
As already indicated in the introduction, tax compliance may be seen in terms of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. The two activities are usually distinguished in terms of legality, 
with avoidance referring to legal measures to reduce tax liability and evasion to illegal 
measures. While some commentators see non-compliance only as an evasion problem, this 
does not seem to capture the full nature of the problem. Clearly tax evasion is a form of non-
compliance. However, if taxpayers go to inordinate lengths to reduce their liability this could 
hardly be considered „compliance‟ either. Such activities might include engaging in artificial 
transactions to avoid tax, searching out every possible legitimate deduction, using delaying 
tactics and appeals wherever this might reduce the flow of tax payments and so on. „Tax 
exiles‟ even seem to prefer to emigrate rather than fulfill their obligations as citizens. Even if 
such activities are within the letter of the law, they are clearly not within the spirit of the law. 
Compliance might therefore be better defined in terms of complying with the spirit as well as 
the letter of the law. 
 
Many of the studies of compliance are concerned with intentional non-compliance. There is, 
however, considerable scope for unintentional non-compliance. Full compliance may require 
positive actions on the part of the taxpayer to discharge his or her legal duties in full. It may 
be that taxpayers innocently fail to meet their tax obligations because they fail to complete 
their tax returns correctly or are unaware of, or misunderstand, various provisions of the tax 
system, or for similar reasons. Attempts by different tax authorities to improve tax 
administration in this respect have often found the problem of assisting taxpayers more 
difficult than might at first appear (see, for example, James et. al., 1987 and James, Sawyer 
& Wallschutzky, 1998). A further complication is that some taxes might actually have been 
imposed in the hope that they would be avoided. For instance, it has been argued that 
higher taxes on alcoholic drinks (Cook & Moore, 1994; Irving & Sims, 1993) and tobacco 
(Viscusi, 1994) would reduce the consumption of those products and this would lead to 
improvements in the health of the population. Any such changes in behaviour would 
constitute tax avoidance but it would be in the spirit as well as the letter of the law. There 
have also been developments in other forms of “corrective taxation” referred to as 
environmental taxes (Smith, 1992; Symonds, Proops & Gay, 1994; Cordes, Nicholson & 
Sammartino, 1990), or “green taxes” (Oates, 1995). The „tax gap‟ method of viewing 
compliance is clearly inapplicable in such cases. Furthermore, although the alcohol and 
tobacco examples are very clear, the tax system is used by governments as an instrument of 
policy in all sorts of ways - encouraging some activities and discouraging others. Compliance 
in this context would appear to indicate compliance with government policy in the wider 
sense, rather than just compliance with tax law. 
 
The tax avoidance/evasion issue may be important with respect to tax compliance for 
another reason. The two activities are defined the way they are with an implicit assumption 
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that it is always possible to distinguish between the two. Of course, this is not always true. 
Seldon and others (1979) coined the term tax „avoision‟ to denote those areas of the tax 
system where the law is unclear. This aspect has been discussed in a New Zealand context 
by Sawyer (1996). To the extent that there is such uncertainty in a tax system, it follows that 
tax compliance should follow the spirit of the law. It would therefore seem that compliance is 
a much wider issue than simply the gap between actual revenue and some concept of 100 
per cent of revenue collected. A final definition of compliance might therefore be: the 
willingness of individuals and other taxable entities to act in accordance within the spirit as 
well as the letter of tax law and administration without the application of enforcement activity. 
There is no measure of such a definition that is both simple and accurate. However, this 
definition does indicate the main features, which should be considered in judging the 
compliance of taxpayers with the tax system. 
 
The Purpose of Taxation and Tax Compliance 
A further dimension to this topic is the purpose of tax compliance. There is no real alternative 
to taxation to pay for the high levels of public expenditure that modern economies demand. It 
is possible to charge for a few government activities. However, the possibilities are very 
limited and, if such activities are commercially viable, it could be argued that they can be left 
to private sector. Governments can also raise resources by borrowing, but the scope is 
limited and the interest and the principal of these funds must eventually be repaid by 
revenue generated from taxation. 
 
Taxation does not exist in some sort of economic, social and political vacuum. Taxation is a 
means not an end. It is therefore an advantage if compliance can be achieved willingly and 
on a genuinely voluntary basis so far as that is possible. It detracts from the whole purpose 
of raising taxation for the public benefit if compliance can only be achieved under the threat 
of severe penalties and enforcement action. If the amount of suffering involved in raising the 
revenue is greater than the benefits from the associated public spending then something is 
clearly wrong. 
 
Yet it appears that some revenue authorities, at least on some occasions, have followed the 
policy that the most important objective is maximum tax compliance, regardless of other 
considerations. An early example comes from the work on differences in compliance 
behaviour of revenue authorities by Schmölders (1970). In 1970 he used survey evidence 
from five European countries to examine different tax regimes. In the case of Germany he 
found that tax compliance was satisfactory in the narrow „tax gap‟ sense but this involved 
other disadvantages as a result of a high degree of „confrontation‟, which led to general tax 
resistance. 
 
It has also been alleged that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the USA has used a 
heavy hand regarding compliance and some examples are given by Payne (1993). In 
fairness, the IRS has also recognised the gains from voluntary compliance, for example, with 
its mission based document Compliance 2000 and has made serious attempts to find other 
ways to promote compliance (Internal Revenue Service, 2000). 
 
Explanations of Tax Compliance 
The following table summarises some of the points of the two different approaches to tax 
compliance. 
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Table 1 
Approaches to Tax Compliance 
 
 
Tax Compliance First Approach Second Approach 
Concept of:  Tax Gap  
100% compliance less  
actual revenue. 
Voluntary 
Willingness to act in 
accordance with the spirit as 
well as the letter of the law. 
 
Definition Narrower Wider 
 
Tax compliance Economic rationality Behavioural co-operation 
 
Exemplified by:  Trade off: 
1. Expected 
benefits of 
evading. 
2. Risk of detection 
and application 
of penalties. 
3. Maximise 
personal wealth 
 
Individuals are not simply 
independent, selfish utility 
maximisers. They interact 
according to differing 
attitudes, beliefs, norms and 
roles. 
Success depends on co-
operation. 
 
Issues of: Efficiency in resource 
allocation 
Equity, fairness and 
incidence 
 
Taxpayer seen as:  Selfish calculator of 
pecuniary gains and 
losses 
“Good citizen” 
 
Can be termed the: Economic approach Behavioural approach 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue services and a variety of academic disciplines suggest there are two basic 
approaches to the problem of compliance. One is to analyse compliance in terms of 
economic decisions based on the likely economic incentives and costs of complying or not 
complying. This is based on a relatively narrow concept of economic rationality and 
developed using economic analysis. The other has been to examine the effects of other 
factors on compliance decisions, particularly as they relate to taxpayer behaviour and 
sometimes tax agency behaviour. This is concerned with wider behavioural issues and 
draws heavily on concepts and research from disciplines such as psychology and sociology. 
 
 
It could be argued that these two approaches link in with the narrow and wider concepts of 
tax compliance respectively. If tax compliance is seen primarily as a problem of evasion, law 
enforcement seems to be the main issue. Here, the economic approach has particular 
relevance as it is very suitable for examining the trade-offs between the expected benefits of 
evading tax with the risk of detection and the application of penalties. If compliance is more 
widely defined, involving taxpayers' decisions to avoid tax legitimately or the diligence with 
which they discharge their obligations, the behavioural approach seems to be particularly 
relevant. 
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The economic approach is based on a narrow view of economic rationality under which it is 
assumed that individuals will wish to maximise their personal income and wealth. They will 
not comply with the tax system unless the benefits of doing so exceed the costs of not doing 
so in the form of fines and penalties. It has been narrowly defined as a straightforward 
„calculus of pleasure and pain‟ in pecuniary terms (Jevons, 1871). As Bernasconi (1998) put 
it, „evading tax is like gambling‟. There are gains to be made if the evasion is successful and 
costs in terms of penalties if it is not. It is just a matter of adding up the expected utility in 
financial terms of every decision to comply or not to comply with the requirements of the tax 
system. 
 
This narrow economic view assumes, implicitly or otherwise, that individuals are immoral 
and operate in some sort of social vacuum. Tax evasion is then explained simply in terms of 
factors such as the level of tax rates, the probability of being caught evading, the penalties 
that would be imposed and the degree of risk aversion. An early model on these lines was 
published by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Since that time, that approach has dominated 
the academic literature in economics and many refinements of a technical nature have been 
made. This has led to research on a whole series of different aspects of economic 
compliance decisions. Polinsky and Shavell (2000) summarise some of the work on the 
economic theory of law enforcement and Andreoni et al. (1998) with specific reference to tax 
compliance. The basic questions addressed, include the level of resources that should be 
devoted to enforcement, the relative effectiveness of a higher level of auditing or more 
severe penalties, and the form the penalties should take. 
 
Uncertainty is also a factor in these calculations (for example, Alm, Jackson & McKee, 1992) 
and can, of course, extend to other participants - such as risk averse tax collectors (Tzur & 
Kraizberg, 1995). This leads on to the costs of concealment (Cremer & Gahvari, 1994). The 
chances of getting caught are also obviously important so the probability of being detected 
comes into it (Fischer, Wartick & Mark, 1992) as do the deterrent effects of auditing non-
compliance (Dubin & Wilde, 1989) and the relative effects of different audit schemes (Alm, 
Bahl & Murray, 1993; Collins & Plumlee, 1991). Tax agents are also important, as are the 
penalties applying to them (Cuccia, 1994). A further refinement is the willingness of the tax 
authority to renegotiate penalties (Cho, Linn & Nakibullah,1996). This „cost-benefit‟ approach 
can be extended to the point that compliance can be improved with pecuniary rewards to 
taxpayers (Falkinger & Walther, 1991). 
 
Turning to administration, the economic approach provides the theoretical underpinning for 
the huge debate about the effectiveness of auditing and the form it should take. There has 
been a considerable amount of work examining the effect of detection probability on 
taxpayer compliance. A survey of some of the literature was published in 1992 by Fischer et 
al. (1992), and the work done then and since has covered many possible angles. For 
example, Linster (1997) examined the possibility that different groups of taxpayers had 
different degrees of risk aversion and auditing policy should be designed to take this into 
account. 
 
There is also little doubt that, with respect to auditing policies, both tax agencies and 
taxpayers „interact strategically to achieve their respective ends‟. It is not surprising, that 
experimental evidence, for example by Alm, Cronshaw & McKee (1993) has indicated quite 
strongly that the strategic selection of tax returns by a revenue service for audit is generally 
more effective than a random selection in detecting errors. 
 
The form the penalties should take has also been raised. Imprisonment is not only costly but 
prevents the guilty party from contributing to economic output - a double loss - and might 
therefore, in general terms, be inferior to fines. Possibly the deterrent effect of imprisonment 
might have a beneficial behavioural effect on others tempted to cheat, but it is a costly 
option. 
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There are various aspects of tax administration that might be investigated further, such as 
mistakes in enforcement activity by revenue agencies. There are obviously two sorts – one 
where a taxpayer is found liable to tax where no genuine liability exists and the opposite 
situation where a taxpayer with a genuine tax liability is mistakenly not found liable. Once 
more, there is an economic trade-off. Mistakes have costs, but so does devoting more 
resources to reducing the risk of their occurring. More generally, there are choices to be 
made between operating a tax system at a high level of accuracy but at greater 
administrative cost and one that is more rough and ready but cheaper to operate. Such 
issues have been raised, for example, with respect to self-assessment (Barr et al., 1977; 
James, 1995). 
 
This approach based on economic rationality, narrowly defined, has limitations and has been 
subject to many challenges, such as those of Etzioni (1988) and Mansbridge (1990). 
Furthermore, in the specific case of compliance, some of the conclusions of the economic 
approach do not seem to be consistent with taxpayer behaviour. Indeed, according to Smith 
and Kinsey (1987), the analysis predicts that most people evade tax, which does not seem 
to be generally true. In fact, there is empirical evidence that many taxpayers are inherently 
honest and will disclose their financial affairs accurately regardless of the incentive to cheat 
(Erard & Feinstein, 1994b; Gordon, 1989). Indeed, the level of tax compliance appears to be 
generally quite high in most countries, see for example, Graetz and Wilde (1985) and 
Skinner and Slemrod (1985). Furthermore, experimental evidence (Baldry, 1986) suggests 
that some people never evade, even when the risks are favourable to the taxpayer. In 
addition, those following the economic approach have not normally taken account of equity 
issues, but there is evidence that tax evasion is adversely affected, for example, by the 
perceived inequity between the tax paid and public spending benefits (Wallschutzky, 1984) 
and by the perceived tax evasion by other taxpayers (Porcano, 1988). However, an 
approach that treats human beings as little more than isolated experimental rats in a cage 
may not provide a full explanation of tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Despite these limitations and the intuitive appeal of the wider behavioural approach, the 
economic approach still has a place in tax compliance as it is reasonable to assume that, to 
a greater or lesser degree, financial considerations do influence taxpayer behaviour. For 
corporations, it might be argued that pecuniary considerations and the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth are likely to take precedence over other possible corporate goals (see, 
for example, Brealey & Myers, 2000, ch. 2), thus making the economic approach even more 
appropriate. 
 
In contrast, the behavioural approach draws on other academic disciplines in suggesting that 
there might be additional factors that are important in motivating taxpayers 
regardingcompliance. Sociological studies, for example, have identified a number of possible 
explanatory factors, such as social support, social influence, attitudes and certain 
background characteristics such as age, gender, race and culture (see, for example, Meier & 
Johnson, 1977 and Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Psychology has reinforced this approach 
and even produced the separate branch of „fiscal psychology.‟ (Schmölders,1970; Lewis, 
1982). Attitudes towards the state and revenue authorities are important, as are perceptions 
of equity. Individuals‟ roles in society and accepted norms of behaviour are also important. 
The essential thrust of these contributions from sociology and psychology are that 
individuals are not simply independent, selfish, utility maximisers (though this may be partly 
true). They also inter-act with other human beings according to differing attitudes, beliefs, 
norms and roles. The result is that tax compliance may be viewed, as Schmölders (1970, 
p.305) suggests, as a „behavioural problem‟ and that „the success of an income tax depends 
on co-operation.‟ 
 
 
36 
 
The importance of equity and fairness has been a theme frequently examined, for example, 
by Bordignon (1993) and Cowell (1992). Other background factors have also been studied 
such as cultural factors (Coleman & Freeman, 1997) and the implications of different political 
systems (Pommerehne, Hart & Frey, 1994). Direct psychological factors, including 
taxpayers' consciences and feelings of guilt and shame, have also been considered (see, for 
example, Hasseldine & Kaplan, 1992; Erard and Feinstein, 1994a). In keeping with this 
approach, others such as Hite (1989) have suggested more positive help for taxpayers. 
There are many different possible methods of achieving this - such as incorporating specific 
messages which have been shown might increase compliance for targeted groups of 
taxpayers (Hite, 1997) or the use of television to change taxpayers' attitudes towards 
fairness and compliance (Roberts, 1994). The truth, of course, is likely to be found in some 
combination of these approaches. Some people might be amoral and totally materially driven 
in which case some incentives and penalties might be usefully applied. However, the 
majority of people seem to exhibit at least some evidence that they respond to social and 
other values and a successful tax compliance policy will take account of these. The danger 
is that the unnecessary application of penalties might provoke taxpayer resistance and 
undermine compliance behaviour on the part of otherwise responsible citizens. This would 
seem to be the basic question for tax compliance policy in an era of self-assessment. 
 
The dependent variable of interest in tax compliance is actual tax behaviour but often the 
process of negotiating access to real taxpayers is difficult, as tax agencies must maintain 
strict confidentiality rules. However confidentiality rules do not mean that experimental 
research in taxation cannot proceed and there are a handful of interesting examples that 
reflect the closer co-operation that tax agencies are having with academic researchers. 
 
The Minnesota Department of Revenue together with a team of external experts (see 
Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod, 2001) conducted an experiment in 1995 using alternative 
strategies to improve voluntary compliance with the state income tax. These strategies 
included: increased auditing of returns with prior notice to taxpayers, enhanced services to 
taxpayers, information messages in letters sent to taxpayers, and a revised simple tax 
return. Through the use of a strong research design (e.g. use of control groups, between-
subjects design), and the use of actual taxpayers (not a convenience sample of adults or 
students), statistical analyses were used to estimate the effects of the alternative strategies 
on reported taxes. 
 
In Australia, social science researchers at the Centre for Tax System Integrity at The 
Australian National University, Canberra are working on a number of projects with 
experimental designs. The Australian Taxation Office has commissioned a research team 
from the Australian Taxation Studies Program (ATAX) to conduct a national study of tax 
compliance costs. Although looking at the topic from the point of view of tax compliance 
costs rather than defining the concept of tax compliance Tran-Nam, Evans, Walpole and 
Ritchie (2000) provide the conceptual framework for measuring tax compliance costs in their 
ATAX study by the following definition. Taxpayer compliance costs are the social compliance 
costs less the cash flow and tax deductibility benefits to taxpayers. Social compliance costs 
are the direct monetary outgoings incurred by taxpayers plus imputed costs of time and 
resources spent by taxpayers. They also “note that cash flow and tax deductibility benefits to 
taxpayers reduce tax revenue and can thus be regarded as costs to tax authorities. The loss 
in tax revenue reduces government expenditure or results in higher taxes or borrowing and 
will thus affect taxpayers and non-taxpayers alike.” They accepted that this framework does 
not embrace all aspects involved. “For example, to be comprehensive, the model would 
need to take into account what have been referred to as psychic costs (stress, anxiety, 
frustration, etc. experienced by taxpayers, especially the elderly) in complying with their tax 
obligations. To date, no studies have managed to successfully incorporate psychic costs, 
although research in this area is taking place (Woellner, 1998). 
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James, Hite, Hasseldine and Toumi  are currently conducting an experiment with actual U.K. 
taxpayers. In the U.K., sole proprietors with turnovers of £15,000 or less can choose to fill in 
an „easy‟ return by filling in their total turnover in one box, their total deductible expenditures 
in a second box, and the resulting subtraction (box 1 – box 2) is taxable income. However, in 
the £14-15,000 bracket, there are more taxpayers than would otherwise be expected. 
Further when this group are audited, they are found to be associated with large audit 
adjustments. That is, dishonest traders are apparently intentionally lowering their turnovers 
in order to reduce their compliance costs when it comes time to file their tax returns. The 
messages being tested with a sample of 9,000 taxpayers include: a „we‟re here to help‟ 
message from the Inland Revenue, a good citizen message, a message of increased 
sanctions (e.g. audits and penalties), and finally one group has been informed that they have 
been pre-selected for audit (prior to them filling in their returns). 
 
Tax Compliance Policy in New Zealand 
Self-assessment tends to be associated with a system of penalties for those who fail to 
assess their own liability and to pay tax as required. In the UK a new system of penalties 
was introduced along with the recent introduction of self-assessment from the tax year 
1996/97. In New Zealand new compliance and penalty rules became law in 1996 partly to 
take account of the „modernisation of tax administration‟ and „an increasing responsibility 
placed on taxpayers to assess their own liability.‟(Inland Revenue Department, 1996, Oct, 
p.7). They came into effect in 1997. As indicated above, there is the risk that an excessively 
harsh regime could be counterproductive in securing the compliance of some taxpayers. 
There has been an important debate between tax professionals and the Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD) in the Accountants Journal and other forums about allegations of the 
IRD‟s apparently extremely tough and inconsistent use of the new penalty provisions. 
Penalties are heavier than they were and a wider variety of types of conduct by taxpayers 
will cause a penalty to be imposed. There is, however, evidence that the Inland Revenue 
Department is aware of the dangers of appearing to be too harsh. For example it 
acknowledged that there had been a feeling that it has been taking a „hard line‟ approach 
with respect to the shortfall penalty regime (Inland Revenue Department, 1998) and is 
responding to those concerns. 
 
There have also been moves to improve the position for at least some taxpayers. For 
instance, one way of clarifying the law is to operate a system of tax rulings (Sandler, 1994). 
In New Zealand a system of binding rulings was introduced in April 1995 and this has 
covered an increasing range of circumstances (Hill, Crawford & Shewan, 1998; Sawyer, 
1997a; Sawyer, 1997b). Furthermore there are new tax disputes resolution procedures, 
which came into effect in October 1996 (Inland Revenue Department, 1996, Aug.) and have 
been examined by Sawyer (1996). 
 
Wallschutzky (1993) pointed out that traditionally most of the attention paid to tax 
compliance by revenue authorities and others has been devoted to why some taxpayers do 
not comply rather than why others do so. It might easily be argued the other way round. The 
norm is usually to comply rather than not to comply and for a tax system to be effective it 
must have the willing co-operation of a majority of taxpayers. It follows that there may be 
greater gains in assisting compliant taxpayers meet their fiscal obligations than in spending 
more resources in pursuing the minority of noncompliers. Many taxpayers might be willing to 
comply in full but are unable to do so because they are not aware of, or do not understand, 
the extent of their obligations. Even if they did, they may not be able to comply for other 
reasons. Additional resources devoted to assisting such taxpayers, for example, by 
improving the flow and quality of information or educating them into becoming more 
responsible citizens, might yield greater revenue than if it were spent on additional 
enforcement activities. In New Zealand in September 1998 there were television campaigns 
to encourage more responsible behaviour with respect to safe driving, alcohol and tobacco. 
There may be a role for further activity of this kind with respect to taxation. 
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It has been argued that taxpayers might need support at different levels (James, Lewis & 
Allison, 1987). New Zealand seems to do well here. Apart from the new binding rulings, 
there is a useful range of explanatory leaflets, which are easily accessible to taxpayers and a 
useful site on the World Wide Web (Inland Revenue Department [online]). 
 
One other way forward is to simplify the tax law. Considerable progress has been made in 
this direction in New Zealand involving a rewrite of the Income Tax Act 1976 (as amended) 
and the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974 (as amended) and other fiscal legislation in 
due course. In examining the work done here, Richardson and Sawyer (1998) found that it 
had been successful in improving readability and comprehensibility as measured by the 
Flesh Index. Such moves have also been made in other countries but tax simplification is not 
a simple process in general (James, Sawyer & Wallschutzky, 1998) nor is simplifying tax law 
in particular (Prebble, 1996). A complicated tax system generates complicated tax laws, 
however simply they are written and other important factors have to be taken into account in 
order to achieve any lasting improvement in this respect. 
 
Conclusions 
Tax compliance is a complex subject with broad implications. There are two main 
approaches the economic and the behavioural, used to encourage taxpayers to comply with 
the taxation system. The economic approach, usually confined to penalties, may be 
necessary to enforce compliance by those taxpayers who would otherwise refuse to 
discharge their obligations as citizens. However, there are dangers in using such an 
approach more widely. It is suggested that taxation is a means to an end and an 
unnecessarily harsh enforcement regime, such as that which appears to have been used in 
some countries, detracts from the whole exercise of raising money for the public benefit. 
Furthermore, such harshness can reduce the willingness of otherwise responsible citizens to 
comply with what may then be perceived as an unjust system. There is a clear need to strike 
the right balance in encouraging voluntary compliance as well as deterring wilful non-
compliance. Despite the limitations of its approach and the intuitive appeal of the wider 
behavioural approach, the economic approach still has a place in tax compliance as it is 
reasonable to assume that, to a greater or lesser degree, financial considerations do 
influence taxpayer behaviour, for example, the maximisation of shareholder wealth in 
corporations. 
 
However, both approaches add to the explanatory behaviour and should be amalgamated 
into a single policy for compliance. The question is how and to what extent? It has already 
been pointed out that tax compliance should be consistent with tax policy generally. 
 
There is still much to learn about taxpayer motivation and how this is influenced by different 
tax compliance policies. As the taxpaying environment is changing, research on taxpayer 
behaviour will be ongoing. A valuable development is the increasing agreement of tax 
collecting organisations to make available their data bases and to allow rigorous research on 
taxpayer returns and details. This will allow research that should lead to a greater 
understanding of behavioural relationships involved in tax compliance. However a more 
immediate task is the development of an approach that incorporates both the economic and 
behavioural approaches to tax compliance. No doubt taxpayers are influenced by both 
economic and other motives, and a successful strategy for tax compliance must give due 
weight to all relevant factors and their interaction. Self-assessment increases the risk that a 
revenue service might resort too readily to a penalty driven compliance policy. With the 
introduction of self-assessment, the revolution of technology and the emergence of the 
global environment this is a trap into which no revenue collecting bureaucracy should be 
allowed to fall. 
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